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Policy Points: 
 Strategically purchasing health care has been and continues to be a popular policy idea 
around the world. 
 Key asymmetries in information, market power, political power, and financial power 
hinder the effective implementation of strategic purchasing. 
 Strategic purchasing has consistently failed to live up to its promises for these reasons. 
Future strategies based on strategic purchasing should tailor their expectations to its 
real effectiveness. 
Context: Strategic purchasing of health care has been a popular policy idea around the world for 
decades, with advocates claiming that it can lead to improved quality, patient satisfaction, efficiency, 
accountability, and even population health. In this article, we report the results of an inquiry into the 
implementation and effects of strategic purchasing. 
Methods: We conducted 3 in-depth case studies of England, the Netherlands, and the United States. We 
reviewed definitions of purchasing, including its slow acquisition of adjectives such as strategic, and 
settled on a definition of purchasing that distinguishes it from the mere use of contracts to regulate 
stable interorganizational relationships. The case studies review the career of strategic purchasing in 3 
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Findings: No existing health care system has effective strategic purchasing because of 4 key 
asymmetries: market power asymmetry, information asymmetry, financial asymmetry, and political 
power asymmetry. 
Conclusions: Further investment in policies that are premised on the effectiveness of strategic 
purchasing, or efforts to promote it, may not be worthwhile. Instead, policymakers may need to focus 
on the real sources of power in a health care system. Policy for systems with existing purchasing 
relationships should take into account the asymmetries, ways to work with them, and the constraints 
that they create. 
Keywords: 
strategic purchasing; contracting; purchasing; health systems. 
Strategic purchasing of health care has been a popular policy idea around the world for almost two 
decades now. Many health systems, including the social insurance countries and the United States, have a long 
history of transactions in which a health service is purchased by some agent that pools funds, such as an 
insurer. But strategic purchasing, part of a family of concepts including commissioning and managed 
competition, is an idea that dates to the mid-1980s and involves adding a list of attributes to the basic act of 
purchasing. Strategic purchasing promises to achieve affordable access to high-quality care, maximize health 
system efficiency, and demand change in financing mechanisms and purchasing tools that reduce 
fragmentation, pool risks, and ensure equity through citizen engagement. It has been put forth in several 
versions, with more or less well developed frameworks intended to specify conditions for its success. It is a key 
component of the World Health Organization’s universal health coverage framework and is also being 
promoted internationally by United States government programs,
1,2
 a level of institutional support that 
ensures continuing conversation about it. 
Most definitions of purchasing roughly agree with the World Health Organization that purchasing 
means the allocation of pooled funds to providers that deliver health care goods and services to the covered 
population, as per the defined benefit package. Strategic purchasing means "active, evidence-based 
engagement in defining the service mix and volume, and selecting the provider mix in order to maximize 
societal objectives.’
1
 The appeal of strategic purchasing as a tool to improve health system performance seems 
to span different types of health systems, with reforms premised on or intended to promise strategic 
purchasing found in Bismarckian, Beveridgean, and hybrid systems, as well as the very different institutional 
environment of the United States.
3-10
 
Although many countries have adopted the name and elements of strategic purchasing, reviews find 
that no country has systematically and successfully incorporated all elements.
3,4,11-13
 However, few of these 
reviews analyzed the implementation of strategic purchasing or tried to develop an understanding of why it 
had the effects it did.
3-7,9,10,12,14
 Why does the idea of strategic purchasing keep disappointing in 
implementation? 
In this article, we argue that the failure is not for want of trying. Rather, it is because there are 
fundamental asymmetries between purchaser and provider that make purchasing unlikely to be strategic in 
any definition. 
In the next section, we review definitions of purchasing, including its slow acquisition of adjectives such 
as strategic, and settle on a definition of purchasing that distinguishes it from the mere use of contracts to 
regulate interorganizational relationships. We then present a theory of why strategic purchasing, as a health 
care policy tool, is unlikely to actually take place. The remainder of the paper reviews the evolution of strategic 
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We chose England, the Netherlands, and the United States as our three case health systems because 
they are internationally known, high-income countries, substantially evaluated, and have attempted to 
promote strategic purchasing through legislation and varying levels of implementation. In other words, we are 
maximizing the seriousness of the policy intent and the quality of the literature, as well as the diversity of 
health systems. These three cases represent both different purchasing systems and different styles of health 
care policy reform (see Table 1).
29,30
 They constitute a fortuitous “most different systems” design.
31
 The three 
systems that have the most extensive and well-documented attempts to introduce strategic purchasing have 
very different health systems, politics, and public-private divisions of labor. If we see the same results in such 
different systems, united only by powerful forces advocating for strategic purchasing, then we can say 
something about strategic purchasing’s utility beyond evaluations of individual countries. 
What Is Strategic Purchasing? 
Although the act of buying health care services is hardly a recent invention, the theory of strategic 
purchasing in its current form is often traced back to Alain Enthoven’s concept of managed competition: 
[A] purchasing strategy to obtain maximum value for consumers and employers, using rules for competition derived from microeconomic 
principles. A sponsor (either an employer, a governmental entity, or a purchasing cooperative), acting on behalf of a large group of 
subscribers, structures and adjusts the market to overcome attempts by insurers to avoid price competition. The sponsor establishes rules 
of equity, selects participating plans, manages the enrollment process, creates price-elastic demand, and manages risk selection.32 
Enthoven’s concept was influential in England,
33
 where, along with the theories of Alan Maynard, it was 
said to be a major influence over Margaret Thatcher’s government. Thatcher’s government introduced a 
“purchaser-provider split” and an “internal market” into the National Health Service (NHS) systems of the 
United Kingdom with the 1989 Working for Patients program.
34
 The implementation of Working for Patients 
contributed to the language of purchasing, identifying an internal market as a market with a split between 
purchasers and providers. At the time, the Dutch system was seen as the first health system to consistently 
implement Enthoven’s model and, unlike the United Kingdom, also implement insurance competition.
35
 
In principle, the logic of purchasing, as an alternative to hierarchical decisions about resource use, is 
that it allows market-based coordination of decisions. Rather than allocating resources through hierarchies, it 
allows decentralized actors to allocate (at least some) resources in order to better reflect efficiency, priorities, 
and local tastes.
36
 In Hirschman’s terms, it mobilizes the purchaser’s exit option to shape policy at least on the 
margins, since purchasers who do not like a given provider’s offering are able to replace it.
37
 Reliance on group 
purchasers—what Enthoven envisaged—allows both risk pooling and the possibility that the purchasers will 
develop expertise, policy capacity, and data that allow them to make better decisions. 
This means that strategic purchasing excludes policies in which individual patients have full free choice 
of providers, as this may be constrained by a limited network created through the strategic purchasing system. 
There are a variety of systems that combine strategic purchasing policies with patient choice policies, but the 
two mechanisms are different and may contradict each other. Patients are usually not asked to purchase 
strategically because they lack the expertise to gauge quality and might not prioritize overall efficiency. 
Instead, we can expect them to focus on observable issues such as waiting times, convenience, and the 
particular procedures they require. Judging by the English experiences described in this paper, patient choice 
has a better record of actually affecting providers than strategic purchasing does, possibly for that reason. 
Since Enthoven and Working for Patients, the purchaser-provider split, internal markets (another name 
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have all become common health policies. Some social insurance systems have adopted some of the logic of 
purchasing, asking their funds to take a more direct role in prospectively contracting and deciding on care 
(rather than merely retrospectively reimbursing whatever patients choose), and private insurance companies, 
in contexts as different as the United States and the Netherlands, have likewise been asked to take on, or tried 
to take on, a role that looks beyond price and quantity. 
Purchasing has also acquired adjectives, most of all strategic. It is a case of what Theodore Marmor has 
noted, namely, the use of adjectives as a rhetorical device to make a concept attractive.
8,38
 “Managed care” is 
one example. Just as nobody would want unmanaged uncaring health services, nobody would prefer that their 
purchasing be unstrategic. 
The use of adjectives allows authors to expand the range of characteristics that they attribute to their 
desired form of purchasing, defining it by what they want it to be and do. For example, Enthoven specifies that 
purchasers shall seek “maximum value,” that the rules shall be “derived from microeconomic principles,” and 
that the market shall be structured by sponsors to prevent anticompetitive behavior, promote equity and 
elasticity, and manage risk selection. That will elevate mere purchasing to managed competition, and the 
sponsor will certainly do a great deal of management—in an enlightened and informed fashion—if it is to 
work. 
It is an intimidating list of requirements for a policymaker. Intellectually, it sets up what philosophers 
call no-true-Scotsman fallacies. A “no-true-Scotsman” fallacy is one that tries to preserve generalizations (eg, 
“strategic purchasing promotes efficiency”) by adding ad hoc qualifications that rule out a counterexample (eg, 
a given country with an apparently failed implementation of strategic purchasing did not really have strategic 
purchasing because the legal framework did not incorporate “adherence to microeconomic principles”).
39
 
Thus, any failure of strategic purchasing can be attributed to its not really being strategic purchasing and 
should not be held against the concept. 
The problem compounds if a policy cannot actually be implemented. In that case, proponents can 
always argue that it failed because of its implementation, even if they really should be held accountable for 
advocating for an idea that cannot be implemented. It is less a no-true-Scotsman fallacy than a no-true-unicorn 
fallacy, since at least Scottish people exist. 
We want to underline the scale of definitional expansion here, visible in Table 2. Simple “purchasing” or 
“contracting” happens in many ways and holds little obvious promise for reforming health systems. Each 
author, in definitions and in frameworks, has added a range of additional desiderata to differentiate strategic 
purchasing and make it attractive or at least something that can be evaluated. We also want to underline 
another definitional slippage, between frameworks and definitions. Some authors clearly define strategic 
purchasing, and others provide frameworks for it to work, which look like definitions but whose status is not 
quite clear (eg, if a framework identifies what is necessary for strategic purchasing to work, what is a policy 
that fulfills few or none of the requirements but that has been called strategic purchasing?). The synthetic 
definition at the bottom of Table 2 tries to distill the commonalities by defining strategic purchasing as “an 
evidence-based process that sculpts health care systems by prioritizing the financing of certain goods and 
services over others through collaborative planning across various healthcare stakeholders while incorporating 
the needs and priorities of citizens in the distribution of health care and promoting equity, quality of care, 
efficiency, and responsiveness in the provision of health services.” Some recent policies have also tried to 
incorporate population health (eg, “social determinants” such as unsafe living conditions, lack of exercise, or 
poor diet). We expect that the challenges facing strategic purchasing would be found in population health 
initiatives, but they might be more serious due to the complexity of trying to address broad social 
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Why Strategic Purchasing Fails 
Researchers have failed to find examples of effective strategic purchasing, including those whose 
papers are cited in this section.
13
 Most of these views focus on misaligned incentives.
1,4,6,9,40-45
 But finding 
repeated negative evaluations of a policy is not the same thing as finding a reason why the policy 
systematically fails. Attempting the latter, we argue that the absence of strategic purchasing by any definition 
is the result of four key asymmetries (see Table 3) that lead to power imbalances between purchaser and 
provider (or patient), which are difficult or unlikely to change. 
Information Asymmetries 
Information asymmetries are the first problem. Arrow’s classic analysis of health care economics points 
to the problem.
46,47
 Purchasers suffer from information asymmetries relative to the providers they seek to 
contract with or individual patients. This means that effective needs assessment or utilization reviews, as well 
as purchasing decisions, will be very costly and often require more information and time than can be had 
within existing financial, technical, and organizational capacity to collect and use data. The temptation will be 
to simply continue purchasing more or less what was purchased last year, or use crude approaches that can 
lead to backlash. 
Political Power Asymmetries 
Literature about strategic purchasing is often framed in terms of exogenous incentives, but what if 
some actors can deploy political power to change the incentive structure or prevent it from having the 
expected effects? Strategic purchasers are intervening with purely financial instruments in decisions about 
patient care, professionalism, and the behavior of large community institutions such as hospitals and 
universities. We posit that strategic purchasers, whether insurance companies or special purpose 
organizations such as England’s clinical commissioning groups (CCGs), will always be politically weaker than 
patients, professionals, or hospitals. As a result, any serious efforts by a payer to discipline a provider by 
pushing patients elsewhere will be undercut by medical and patient noncompliance and risks political backlash 
when politicians choose to intervene to save a hospital or treat patients differently. It also means that 
purchasers are expendable, as seen in their constant reorganization in the UK systems (and their 
unproblematic abolition in Scotland, discussed later in the paper). 
Market Power Asymmetries 
Market power asymmetry refers to competitive structures, and geographical constraints, that lead to a 
lack of competition and imbalances such as between monopoly providers and purchasers. It is not universal 
but is certainly common in remote and rural areas and some entire countries. A purchaser has power—an exit 
option—only if there are competing providers with spare capacity. The assumption of competing options with 
spare capacity is not always operative, for reasons of population density, geography, or investment in health 
care facilities. For example, if hospitals are all run at high rates of bed occupancy and there is no capital 
funding for expansion, then there is no reason to seek more patients. Often, providers attempt to strategically 
increase their own market power by merging.
48
 This is a common situation in historically tightly budgeted 
countries that have not sought to create spare capacity (eg, the UK systems); but it can also happen in markets 












Finally, existing strategic purchasing involves, at best, routing patients to one provider over another 
(assuming that information and power asymmetries mean purchasers can actually do that). For this to 
discipline providers, the amount of money purchasers have and can redirect must suffice to make providers 
responsive to purchasers. In general, purchasers do not have enough money to influence providers, especially 
capital investment, and when they do it is at the margins. Even if payers did have enough money to shape 
capital investments, political difficulties would still hinder their ability to threaten disinvestment. 
The money associated with each patient episode, however calculated, is usually closer to the marginal 
cost of the procedure than to a cost including enough profit to finance capital investment. In the United States, 
hospital capital investment is substantially funded by fee-for-service payments and bond markets, which take 
future income from all sources (public and private payers) into account. Some systems have tariffs that include 
future capital expenditure needs. In other systems, the government (national, regional, or local) is almost 
always responsible for capital expenditure. As a result, a hospital that benefits from strategic purchasing might 
be able to build up a useful financial cushion, hire some marginal staff, or buy some equipment, but it is highly 
unlikely to actually be able to access the kind of money needed for real capital investment through that route. 
As a result, the capital investments that form the skeleton of the health care system are often decided by 
governments, not strategic purchasers. This is the same reason why classic Bismarckian systems, for all their 
emphasis on insurance funds and organized professions, had capital come from the state, local governments, 
or churches in almost every case, and therefore had delivery systems shaped by politics rather than social 
insurance. Last, this financial asymmetry also affects the purchaser’s ability to selectively contract, as 
governments will generally not allow institutions that received substantial government funding to go bankrupt. 
In principle, this is the easiest asymmetry to address, since all it requires is that capital expenditure budgets be 
given to the payers and incorporated into the strategic purchasing process. But it is vulnerable to cost 
containment efforts that allow the capital component of the payment to drop over time, as might have 
happened in England. Moreover, as the Dutch case study shows, even where insurers control the money, 
including capital, and contract selectively, they may still lack the tools necessary to steer patients to preferred 
providers. 
These four asymmetries amount to saying that purchasers are the least informed and economically or 
politically powerful players in the system. Further, in many cases they will lack the financial ability to 
determine capital expenditures in any purposeful way. Their strategies are accordingly going to have limited 
impact on health care. We explore these dynamics in the fate of three ambitious strategic purchasing 
initiatives: England, the Netherlands, and the United States. 
The United Kingdom and England 
England is the homeland of purchasing as a key policy instrument. It is where the theory that 
purchasing should be adopted and be made strategic was introduced into national health service systems, and 
where we have had by far the longest experience of efforts to build a health system around strategic 
purchasing. 
Working for Patients, the 1989 NHS reform, was the first explicit effort to turn purchasing into a policy 
instrument as part of a package of reforms that sought to introduce competition as a force in a national health 
service system. Essentially, it split apart purchasers and providers and set up purchasing of care as the action 
that linked them and would give power to the purchasers. The purchaser-provider split meant two things. One 
was that health authorities, which previously managed providers, would become purchasers of care. This was 
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custom of the territorial purchasers. The second was that individual general practitioners could also choose to 
become purchasers (“fundholders”), purchasing care from trusts on behalf of their patients. The government, 
after enacting the reform, almost immediately sought to reduce its potentially destabilizing effects by, for 
example, discouraging price competition and major shifts in patient flows that might shut down uncompetitive 
trusts. There was one major evaluation, which found small-scale improvements in NHS efficiency and quality.
50
 
Enthoven soon made it clear that the United Kingdom did not implement his ideas sufficiently, so what might 
appear to be the premier test of his concept of managed competition was not so.
51
 
The Labour Party under Tony Blair initially abolished fundholding in England, grouping fundholders with 
non-fundholding general practitioners (GPs) into primary care groups to advise health authorities on what to 
purchase. Within just a few years, the Labour Party shifted back toward a focus on strategic purchasing as a 
key part of the system. First, it turned Primary Care Groups into Primary Care Trusts and made them 
responsible for purchasing. Then it introduced a standard diagnosis-related group (DRG) tariff system for 
England, called Payment by Results, and set out to invite new providers from the private sector into the NHS as 
competition for the incumbent NHS trusts. It also introduced the term commissioning, which was a case of 
purchasing-with-adjectives, incorporating issues such as attention to equity, data, and community health into 
the definition of the action. Developments in commissioning came alongside a focus on individual patient 
choice, which included letting patients choose their hospitals when they required treatment. Late in the Blair 
government, the administration began to experiment with “practice-based commissioning,” which was much 
like GP fundholding. 
The best (but still hotly contested) evaluations of competition in these years were focused on the 
influence of patient choice, rather than the strategic purchasers.
45,52,53
 They found that competition among 
hospitals for patients improved efficiency and, in some cases, quality, presumably because the gains or losses 
of patients on the margin was enough to improve management of the hospital overall. Notably, the 
mechanism of strategic purchasing, as against patient choice affecting hospitals at the margins, barely 
appeared in these studies. 
Under David Cameron’s coalition government, a highly contentious health reform led by Secretary of 
State Andrew Lansley swept away the existing infrastructure of commissioning in England. It transferred most 
of the budget to a multiplicity of CCGs of GPs, who were to be the strategic purchasers for their patients, and 
left the rest in the hands of NHS England, which purchased key national services and would be responsible for 
the overall direction of commissioning. Whether or not this project, with its small CCGs, would have been 
workable, the simultaneous arrival of austerity meant that policy shifted toward care integration. Integration, 
rather than competition, was to maximize efficiency even at the price of leaving no spare resources for 
innovation or competition. From the perspective of individual patients, their ability to choose providers 
remained the same, though probably with fewer providers to choose from as budget constraints bit. The sheer 
difficulty of characterizing NHS policy and operations since these reforms, and the simultaneous impact of 
austerity, has made them difficult to evaluate.
54
 
Meanwhile, there was something of a rebellion against the concept in Scotland and Wales after they 
gained political autonomy in 1998. Both systems eliminated the purchaser-provider split and purchasing 
mechanisms, instead choosing to build their health systems around territorially integrated boards,
55
 and 
suffered no apparent loss of efficiency, equity, or effectiveness as a result. Although the systems in Scotland 
and Wales can be criticized in a variety of ways, there has been no demonstration that their failures can be 
attributed to abandoning the purchaser-provider split, and the Commonwealth Fund found that Scotland had 
the lowest administrative costs of any of the health systems it studied (Wales was not in the study).
56-58
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The United Kingdom made different attempts to impose strategic purchasing in England, often at the 
same time as attempts to expand individual patient choice and top-down target setting or regulatory 
initiatives. There were some clearly implemented patient choice policies that had effects on the margins, in 
hospital quality and efficiency. Each of our four asymmetries was at work and helped to explain why there is 
not much evidence that purchasing was in any way strategic or led to identifiable outcomes. 
Information Asymmetries. 
At the dawn of the internal market, public health officers were often focused on purchasing because 
they had the best data skills.
59
 Despite extensive efforts to improve commissioning and data use skills since 
then, there are recurrent complaints about the quality and quantity of data available to commissioners as well 
as a clear tendency for the CCGs to have even less data, and analysis skill, than the Primary Care Trusts they 
replaced. 
Political Power Asymmetries. 
As one article studying efforts to close services noted, the management structures of the English NHS 
change constantly, but the structure of the services and their locations change extremely slowly.
60
 The focus of 
debates about closures is on individual services such as maternity units, because an overt attempt to close an 
entire hospital in England is essentially unknown. Any proposal to close a service, however economically 
marginal or poor quality the service may be, tends to be met by an opposition campaign, and higher-level 
authorities encourage managers to desist. At most, problematic trusts are merged with other trusts. The basic 
threat of competition—that failing organizations will be forced to exit the market—does not appear to matter. 
Market Power Asymmetries. 
Market power was clearly identified as an issue in the evaluations of patient choice, with greater local 
competition associated with greater improvements in hospital efficiency under patient choice policies.
61
 It 
appears that the problem was more severe for purchasers, which were usually stuck with their dominant local 
providers.
62
 Their ability to move enough patients to threaten a provider was limited, as was the scale of any 
single purchaser relative to the trusts. They also had to work with trusts to shape the health economy, which 
demanded long-term reciprocity and trust that made it hard to comparison shop for services. As a result, in 





 Financial asymmetries incorporated the same problem as seen with market power asymmetries. The 
bulk of the literature on NHS capital investment focuses on analyzing the use of public-private partnerships 
(PPP, which in the NHS systems is best known as Private Finance Initiative, PFI). This literature can be very 
critical.
64
 But the core problem is that no District Health Authority, Primary Care Group, Primary Care Trust, or 
CCG has had enough money to shape trusts’ decisions because the tariff, despite efforts, does not cover 
enough capital expenditure.
54,65
 The tariff scheme Payment by Results incorporates capital expenditures 
related to policies named in the NHS Mandate (the mission statement given to the NHS by the government) 
that are specified to be paid through the tariff and incorporates adjustments for depreciation and purchasing 
power parity. In practice, efficiency relative to the tariff might allow trusts to build a cushion against 
emergencies but will not allow them to finance new services or infrastructure. Purchasers, meanwhile, are 
fragmented enough that even if the tariff did reliably cover capital costs, it is unlikely that any one or two CCGs 








In short, efforts to use strategic purchasing (whether called the internal market, purchasing, or 
commissioning) have been a constant in English health policy since 1989 despite fluctuating regulatory 
frameworks and reorganizations of the purchasing side. Much of English health policy since Working for 
Patients amounts to churning through different kinds of commissioners in the search for a strategic purchaser 
that will deliver benefits. There is no real evidence that this churn has produced any useful lessons about how 
to make strategic purchasing work better. And what is striking is that there is very little evidence that the 
different efforts to create strategic purchasing have been effectively implemented or are responsible for the 
changing outcomes of the NHS. Meanwhile, Scotland and Wales abandoned the entire purchaser-provider 
split, which reduced administrative costs in Scotland and had no clear effect on either country’s system’s 
efficiency or quality. 
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, purchasing became a central tenet of the health system after a major health reform 
in 2006, happening after 30 years of failed attempts to integrate the social health insurance system and the 
private health insurance system. Earlier attempts failed after strong opposition from key stakeholders (ie, 
private health insurers, employers, and physicians), but several smaller and incremental market-oriented 
reforms brought the public system in line with the private system, making unification of the schemes a 
commonsense next step supported by key stakeholders.
66
 
The new system aimed to reduce the emphasis on government regulation of health care supply, 
increase efficiency through strategic purchasing, and increase fairness through the reduction of fragmentation 
to ultimately offer more affordable and patient-driven health care.
66,67
 In 2006, a single private insurance 
scheme following the principles of managed competition was established. In this system, the insurer plays a 
key role as a strategic purchaser—allowed to selectively contract and expected to negotiate on the basis of 
price, volume, and quality of care. However, more than a decade into this reform, purchasing fails to 
incorporate quality measures on a large scale.
15,68,69
 Most contracts seek to control costs and run for only one-
year, often lacking agreements on quality of care or patient outcomes.
70
 Moreover, no health needs 
assessments are made, and contracting is predominantly based on historical data. This purchasing setup has 
not led to the desired macro-level cost containment, forcing the government to intervene on numerous 
occasions. Examples include concluding multistakeholder agreements about spending limits to rein in growth 
in hospital care and nurturing the development of quality measures. 
Why Strategic Purchasing Did Not Happen 
Insurers generally lack the incentives, tools, expertise, and meaningful quality data to control costs and 
have a direct effect on care quality. Evidence is growing to illustrate this further. For example, Douven et al. 
hypothesized that effective insurer-hospital negotiations would result in limited price variation across hospitals 
for the same service, but their results showed that the opposite is true.
71
 Another study hypothesized that the 
Dutch hospital market governed under managed competition would lead to substantial budget reallocations 
between providers.
72
 Also here, the hypothesis was rejected, as yearly budget reallocations were remarkably 
stable over long periods of time. In fact, much higher yearly budget reallocations were found for 
municipalities, which act as noncompeting purchasers of social care. Each of the four asymmetries helps 
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At the inception of the reforms, the government assumed that competing insurers would have 
sufficient incentives to purchase based on prices and volume but also on quality, in order to achieve an 
advantage over competitors and attract more customers. However, the insurers have been—and still are—
reluctant to use quality information for contracting policies. This is partly because the government and 
insurers have been unable to develop, provide, or nurture enough meaningful information to make health 
markets more transparent. 
However, there have been attempts to change this situation through a new quality institute, which 
imposed a mandatory framework for the development of care standards, clinical guidelines, and performance 
measures. Moreover, a new policy goal attempts to make treatments of 50% of the disease burden 
transparent with outcome indicators by 2022. Insurers increasingly claim to have collected data on quality and 
cost, but how valid and reliable such information is has been left open to question due to past provider 
criticisms.
73
 Therefore, some insurers are experimenting with new approaches to shift purchasing from a price-
and-volume focus to a best-value-based focus.
69,74
 But these developments are still only accounting for a small 
share of total purchasing volume. 
Additionally, evidence suggests that the decision to switch insurers is rarely motivated by the quality of 
contracted care providers but rather by price.
75,76
 This undermines the effectiveness of a comprehensive 
quality strategy to attract customers and perhaps takes away the incentive to use it in purchasing.
77
 
Political Power Asymmetries. 
Maarse and colleagues framed the relationship between insurers and providers as a power conflict in 
which providers find that the power shift has gone too far and GPs perceive the offered contracts as a diktat.
68
 
However, others have argued that the bargaining position of health insurers vis-à-vis GPs and hospitals 
remains relatively weak.
69,78
 In the Netherlands, GPs are represented in a strong professional organization 
called the National Association of General Practitioners (LHV). They have effectively used their long-standing 
relationship with their patients to mobilize public support against contracting practices and enforcement of 
competition policies. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, insurers hardly use selective contracting in GP care and generally pay the 
maximum prices as set by the Dutch Healthcare Authority.
69 
A similar picture is evident among hospitals, 
where insurers have been reluctant to engage in selective contracting, fearing an outcry from politicians, the 
public, and the media, as Dutch patients generally do not like to travel for their care. Furthermore, consumers 
seem to question whether insurers with restrictive networks are committed to providing good quality care.
75,79
 
In addition, evidence is growing that trust in Dutch insurers is eroding. This may further hamper the ability of 
insurers to use selective purchasing and steer patients to preferred providers.
80,81
 
Lastly, there has been deep political division over the direction of the reforms. Depending on the 
coalition in charge, market reforms—which take years to establish—have been slowed down or accelerated, 
allowing proponents of market reform to argue that it does not work as envisaged because key preconditions 
(eg, quality, transparency) have not been met.
82-85
 
Market Power Asymmetries. 
The Dutch insurance market has been aggressively consolidating, resulting in 4 large insurers having 
about 90% of the market.
86
 One would think that this would greatly enhance the bargaining position of the 
insurers. But even though GPs work in small independent practices, they are well organized in the LHV, and 
not contracting with some could imply a forced breaking up of long-standing relationships between the GP and 
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be rolled out in other areas, has led to a rapid proliferation of new care groups that consist of several 
practices, further strengthening their negotiation position. This provides a good example of the bad fit 
between market mechanisms and the international trend for better coordination and integration between 
providers.
15
 We can interpret the transparency push (eg, a new quality institute, making part of the disease 
burden transparent with outcome indicators), bundled payment schemes, and spending agreements as efforts 
by the government to supplement the private insurers, since their strategic purchasing was not apparently 
effective on its own. The market was failing to deliver the overall strategic purchasing without additional policy 
tools from the state. 
Furthermore, hospitals, supported by lenient competition policy enforcement, have been merging and 
consolidating their position in the Dutch health provision market. The number of hospitals has gone down 
from 90 in 2014 to 79 in 2016. In 2014, general hospitals had a market share of about 58% in their catchment 
area.
85
 The regional dominance of the hospitals helps explain the difficulty insurers have in selectively 
contracting. In the few cases where insurers decided to deny contracts to underperforming hospitals, leading 
to their forced closure, it mostly led to full or partial acquisition by another hospital (eg, Ruwaard van Putten 
and Sionsberg, Slotervaart and IJsselmeer hospitals). This, perhaps ironically, further strengthens the regional 
dominance of hospitals.
87
 The 2018 Slotervaart bankruptcy provides a case in point. Although the Netherlands 
Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) acknowledged that its partial acquisition would lead to a stronger 
position of the buying hospital (OLVG), it allowed the acquisition on the ground that “patients of the 




In the Dutch system, the insurers are regionally dominant and their reimbursements must cover capital 
investment. In theory, they have the financial clout to discipline providers. Yet, the Dutch case shows that this 
does not weigh up against their disadvantage in political and market power. Even if a patient decides to visit a 
noncontracted provider, the insurers still have to reimburse to a level (generally 75% to 80% of total cost) that 
makes it affordable for the patient to pay the rest out of pocket. This limits purchasers' ability to steer patients 
and may mitigate the financial threat of selective contracting. In 2014, a bill to restrict choice to contracted 
providers failed in the senate after criticism that it undermined solidarity and gave insurers too much power to 
decide what care is “good enough.” 
Lessons Learned 
Efforts to strengthen strategic purchasing are severely hampered due to these four asymmetries. In 
2008, the Netherlands Council for Health and Society (RVS), an independent advisory body to the government 
and parliament, called selective contracting the best instrument to adapt to the growing and changing care 
needs of the population. However, in 2017, the RVS published a report offering a damning verdict on 
purchasing, stating that it has not been able to deliver added value for the population and that the expectation 
that it would has been, in hindsight, unrealistic. Purchasing in its current form leads to uniformity, decreased 
trust, and high administrative costs, and it hampers future innovations and prevention initiatives. The RVS 
recommended discontinuation of selective contracting and detailed contracts that specify structural and 
process indicators. It favored an approach where the relationship between the patient and the provider leads 
the process of defining health care needs. It also recommended having longer-term contracts that focus on 
increasing efficiency in administration, facilitating innovation and prevention, and sharing data to improve 
care. The minister chose to ignore the essence of the report (ie, its calls for abolishing selective contracting and 
restrictions in patient choice), but supported the idea of using long-term contracts to facilitate a partnership 
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The United States 
Because of the famous complexity of the US health care sector, it is not possible to characterize the 
United States as having any single dominant form of purchasing in the same way as can be done for the English 
or Dutch systems. Nonetheless, the United States is home to a huge volume of theory and practice on 
purchasing. Its government has repeatedly enacted policies premised on the effectiveness of strategic 
purchasing, such as accountable care organizations, Medicare Advantage, and the introduction of “population 
health” into firms’ insurance decisions. 
Providing an in-depth analysis of the many kinds of purchasers in the United States is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Where important, we highlight aspects of the private insurance market (including employer-
sponsored coverage) to help further explain certain asymmetries. But, to improve comparability with the other 
cases, we focus on one well-established component of the US health system: the publicly funded traditional 
Medicare program, highlighting Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. Medicare Advantage is a type of health plan 
offered by a private insurance company that contracts to provide Medicare Part A (hospitalization) and Part B 
(medical) benefits as well as, in most cases, Part D (drug coverage). MA allows private plan participation in the 
Medicare program. Since MA plans receive a fixed amount of money per month for each enrollee, based on 
the characteristics (eg, demographics, medical diagnoses) of the particular enrollees in their plan, they have 
much stronger financial incentives to be strategic purchasers and seek efficiency relative to traditional 
Medicare through mechanisms such as care integration and alternative payment models.
89
 Further, 
commercial insurers in the MA market can balance risks and negotiate with providers across MA and other 
products they offer. In 2018, more than 2,300 different MA plans were available nationwide, with the average 
Medicare beneficiary able to choose from 21 different plans.
90




Why Strategic Purchasing Did Not Happen 
Although the current adjective attached to purchasing in the United States is more commonly “value-
based” than “strategic,” the basic goal of prioritizing the financing of certain goods and services over others to 
promote equity, quality of care, efficiency, and responsiveness in the provision of health services remains true 
to the theoretical goals of strategic purchasing. However, the transformation from “volume to value” in the US 
health care system has had limited success,
92-117
 being “driven more by ideology and aspiration than by 
evidence.”
118
 In the following sections, we show how the four asymmetries help explain the difficulty of 
implementing strategic purchasing in the United States. Our discussion includes some experience beyond 
Medicare Advantage that sets the context for MA, but we highlight experience within MA. 
Information Asymmetries. 
Massive initiatives to collect data through implementation of electronic medical records (EMRs), as well 
as extensive measurement requirements for “quality-based” payments, have led to a situation in which US 
medical payers are data rich but information poor. While private health insurers, including MA insurers, have 
access to all of their individual patient claims data (often this data is kept proprietary and rarely shared), they 
remain plagued by a lack of pricing transparency. Private insurers often know about care utilization across 
different providers and hospitals, especially those within their networks, but they do not know actual hospital 
costs, patient information if they change insurers, and how much pharmaceutical drugs should cost (or which 
ones are necessary and should be covered). Additionally, hospital and pharmaceutical contracting lacks 
transparency. These negotiations often involve “secret clauses” such as anticompetitive demands, antisteering 
clauses, claim limits, and proprietary price information that cannot be shared.
119-123
 Here, private insurers fail 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
13 
plans. The result is that private insurers (and their respective beneficiaries) continue to face high price 
markups from hospitals seeking to maximize their profits, increasing purchaser costs.
124-127
 
Many private insurers attempt to pass on health care decisions to patients, who are supposed to make 
their own, hopefully well-informed choices on what care to seek and how to save costs. Insurers cannot 
threaten market exit to negotiate prices, so patients are forced to make these “exit” choices. Thus, in the 
private insurance market, employers (as purchasers) are unable, and possibly unwilling, to “purchase for 
value.” 
Moreover, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) struggles to adapt data collection 
initiatives to ever-changing health policies. Most analysis of policy efficacy, effectiveness, and impact is 
conducted by independent researchers using limited publicly available data. CMS has made more data publicly 
available, but the process is slow and there are constant complaints of its poor quality. The behavior of MA 
plans, the quality of care that they provide, and their benefits to the public payer are consequently poorly 
understood.
128,129
 For all but a few people who can access Medicare earlier (eg, people with end-stage renal 
failure), CMS does not know a patient’s medical history prior to the age of 65. 
Data fragmented across payers (MA providers, traditional Medicare, and others), opaque contracts, and 
a continued lack of strong regulatory and price transparency policies make it difficult for privately insured 
patients or their employers to compare prices or value and for the federal government to regulate deviant 
hospital, provider, or private corporate (ie, pharmaceutical) behaviors. Last, the cost burden of information is 
high. Collecting data, analyzing it, storing it, and then disseminating it to the general populace is an expensive 
task that might never produce satisfactory results, might never be worth the resources, increases 
administrative burdens, and requires an incredible amount of coordination between various actors and 
stakeholders. 
Political Asymmetries. 
The political asymmetry that we focus on is the purchaser’s political power compared to patients, 
providers, hospitals, and other key actors. A lack of purchaser political power can hinder the development of 
strategic purchasing, since other actors could use the political system to circumvent strategic purchasers. In 
the case of the United States, this would mean other groups such as providers modifying the regulation or 
purchasing decisions of purchasers. Research on the politics of employer and provider power suggests that 
such opportunistic behavior has happened.
130-132
 
Despite traditional Medicare’s power as the largest single purchaser of health care in the United States, 
Congress has imposed serious limits on its power over providers or its ability to use its power 
strategically.
133,134
 Lobbying groups are numerous and powerful in health care, and providers, including 
provider lobbies, are better regarded by the public than politicians, technocrats, or insurance companies.
134
 
Members of Congress also fear that cutting even the lowest-value services could lead to a backlash from older 
voters.
135,136
 The result is that Medicare is legally constrained from even the most obvious and internationally 
common ways to contain costs and purchase strategically. Famously, it cannot conduct price negotiations on 
medicines backed up by a single formulary. For another example, Medicare is unable to increase its 
administrative costs unless Congress appropriates additional funds to the program for this specific purpose—
even if robust administration could result in greater efficiency (eg, disease management, coordination of care) 
and customer satisfaction (eg, more customer support lines and services). 
Although Medicare reimbursement rates are its principal tool for cost containment, the process of 
deciding those rates fits no definition of strategic purchasing. CMS heavily relies on physician specialty 
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Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC).
131
 Most RUC members are appointed by major 
physician specialty societies. CMS continues to accept the majority of RUC recommendations for the fee 
schedule.
131,137,138
 There is no guarantee that prices will be set fairly, as factionalism among specialty groups 
could impact decision making.
139
 Here, no explicit negotiation between purchaser and provider (or health 
system) is occurring. Despite Medicare’s strong market power in price setting, it still acts as a passive, 
relatively unstrategic purchaser. Moreover, Medicare (like CMS) is a government entity. Although reports and 
testimonies from CMS are taken seriously among policymakers and other purchasers, CMS is formally and 
informally restricted in lobbying Congress or using its expertise to make policy decisions. For example, in 
Provision 6301, the Affordable Care Act prevented Medicare’s Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute 
from using cost-effectiveness analysis. 
MA was to be a solution to the problem of political limitations on traditional Medicare’s ability to 
engage in strategic purchasing by allowing private insurers, chosen by the beneficiaries, to find ways to save 
costs and provide high-quality care, using the private sector to circumvent legislative restrictions on the 
government’s ability to purchase strategically. However, MA faces similar challenges to traditional Medicare. 
Although MA plans can negotiate “narrow networks,” which can allow them to avoid lower-quality or 
higher-cost providers, federal legislation means that providers cannot charge more than standard traditional 
Medicare rates to out-of-network MA patients.
111,140
 MA plans use the same Medicare fee schedules and, 
therefore, face the same political limitations in determining the value of physicians’ work (and resulting 
reimbursement payments) because of the power of physicians in the RUC.
131
 Additionally, MA plans don’t have 
enough market power on their own in the private insurance market to negotiate lower prices, making 
traditional Medicare’s fee schedule the default pricing choice. Relative to doctors, hospitals, and patients, 
managed care plans are low profile, unpopular, and politically weak.
141-146
 
Market Power Asymmetries. 
The market power asymmetry affects prices and occurs when there is a lack of market competition, 
hindering the ability of purchasers to effectively negotiate with providers, hospitals, and health systems. US 
purchasers face varying degrees of market power asymmetry. MA plans, like any insurers who seek to actively 
purchase, face resistance from strategic sellers—providers and health care systems that have merged and 
vertically integrated across the United States to increase their negotiating leverage. 
Hospital and health system mergers have created behemoths that sharply limit competition in many 
markets, increasing prices and loading more risk on insurers.
147,148
 Physician practices in urban and suburban 
areas have seen an increase in mergers that are slowly resulting in price increases.
149,150
 Initial research has 
found such vertical integration to have mixed impacts on quality of care while leading to increases in prices 
instead of cost savings.
147
 Meanwhile, horizontal integration can have anticompetitive effects, weakening 
private insurers’ bargaining power.
147,151
 
Insurers have responded with consolidation. Most states have approximately three private insurers 
collectively claiming at least 80% of the state’s total enrollments.
152
 US insurance companies slowly 
consolidated between 2005 and 2013, with many national commercial insurers purchasing local and regional 
health plans. In 2016, the five largest private insurers covered 43% of the total insured population.
152
 
However, private insurers are faced with a declining employer-based health insurance market and a 
growing Medicare population. Thus, the incentives to capture Medicare payments are high, with the “big 5” 
insurers collectively serving 52% of the Medicare Advantage market.
152
 Relatively few barriers to entry into or 
exit from the market exist for the five biggest private insurers.
152
 But, the MA sector is not large enough to 
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private insurers across multiple lines of business that include MA could be greater than any given MA plan 
alone. Thus, for the most part, MA plans passively accept the Medicare fee schedule and do not renegotiate 
with hospitals and providers for better prices. However, for a select few services (eg, cataract removal) and 
physician reimbursements, MA plans are able to leverage the commercial market’s favorable rates and pay 
lower prices than traditional Medicare.
140
 
During the Aetna and Humana merger court case, traditional Medicare and MA were found to be in 
different product markets, suggesting that they do not directly compete with each other.
153,154
 Instead, MA 
plans compete with other MA plans only in highly concentrated markets with minimal overall 
competition.
155,156
 Furthermore, bonus payments and rebate incentives for 4- or 5-star-rated MA plans 
incentivized the creation of narrow networks. While narrow networks can lead to cost savings (lower total 
costs, not price discounts) and efficiency,
157
 they can also lead to negative outcomes when they have 
insufficient capacity to serve their enrollees or geographically dispersed providers that are difficult to access.
158
 
The lack of need to compete for market share may lead to variance between urban and rural access to 
different MA or private plan options, and to physicians and hospitals that accept Medicare, MA plans, or 
private insurers with narrow networks. Many rural areas have access to only one provider and one MA plan. 
Network adequacy is difficult to measure and determine, with many current standards and regulations failing 
to monitor compliance and ensure appropriate access.
159-161
 The Trump administration has further complicated 
matters by decreasing enforcement and ceding network adequacy regulation to the states.
162
 
Last, insurers' power is weakened due to physician consolidations. The race between insurer and 
provider amalgamation has not shown any signs of empowering insurers or making them more strategic 
purchasers. Physicians, specifically specialists, have the ability to negotiate with purchasers and exploit their 
market power. In theory, their power is supposed to check the powers of private insurers, but the fragmented 
health care system has led to perverse incentives and opportunistic behavior. Certain specialists—notably 
anesthesiologists, emergency department physicians, and radiologists—face limited competition and deal with 
episodic, urgent, and unplanned patient demand for care. This has incentivized them to use their power to 
reject network contracts in order to maximize reimbursements, leading to surprise billing charges. 
Ultimately, MA in the United States and separate strategic purchasers in other systems are simply 
agents for the real payer (governmental or quasi-governmental). This will always create agency problems that 
range from abusing or extorting risk adjustment to passive behavior and an inability to affect the real sources 
of power in the system. 
Financial Asymmetries. 
Although Medicare is the dominant price setter in its own market, hospital profits from it are often far 
less than from private insurers (which are often also the MA payers). Traditional Medicare also directly 
subsidizes physician residency programs (eg, approximately $140,000 per resident is paid directly to the 
hospital through the Direct Graduate Medical Education program) and caps the number of subsidized 
residency slots, moderating (and more recently limiting) the supply of physicians in the United States. 
However, it is otherwise not directly involved in any major health care capital investments. For purchasers 
providing Medicare Advantage, the same methodological problem holds for interpreting the ability of MA to 
affect capital investment and allocation as for gauging its market power. 
Even when considering the role of MA plans in broader strategies adopted by the big insurers, it is 
unrealistic to expect that MA would control enough of a given provider’s revenue to change its capital 
strategies. Moreover, raising capital for health care facilities in the United States is quite unlike raising capital 
in England. Funds can come from a mixture of debt issuance, loans, private capital, and vendor financing, with 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
16 
future income and revenue) across multiple purchasers. In other words, capital markets, rather than any 
purchaser, allocate capital. This means that any strategic purchasing would only work indirectly by effectively 
reallocating resources in a way that capital markets understand, price in, and use to affect providers’ decisions. 
Lessons Learned 
The United States might lack a coherent health care system but there is a great deal of purchasing in its 
health care sector and a consistently high level of interest in policies that promise to use purchasing 
strategically to improve care and contain costs. Overall, it does not appear that an internationally distinctive 
role for insurers and elaborate purchasing schemes has led to cost containment or superior quality in 
American health care, which might lead us to question the added value of its large and unpopular insurance 
industry. We focused on Medicare Advantage, which on paper promises to combine the power of Medicare’s 
size with freedom for insurers to escape the rules that constrain Medicare in its relationships with providers. 
Even in MA, though, the four asymmetries that we find in other systems mean that the effect falls short of any 
advocates' claims for what strategic purchasing might do. 
Conclusion: Impact at the Margins? 
Purchasing of some sort is ubiquitous in health systems. Many health systems, including the social 
insurance countries and the United States, have a long history of transactions in which a health service is 
purchased by some agent that pools funds, such as an insurer. But strategic purchasing, part of a family of 
concepts including commissioning and managed competition, is an idea that dates to the mid-1980s and 
involves adding a list of attributes to the basic act of purchasing. It resembles other concepts that seem 
practical but are actually very aspirational—and might turn out to be completely impractical. 
As was found in Burns and Pauly’s discussion of the “volume to value” transformation in the United 
States, or White’s discussion of the practice variations crusade, strategic purchasing is an unrealistic, albeit 
persistent, solution that promises both everything and nothing.
118,163
 As we noted above, strategic purchasing 
promises to ensure affordable access to high-quality care, maximize health system efficiency, reduce 
fragmentation, pool risks, and ensure equity through citizen engagement. It fails on all counts. 
We found, in three case studies, that in each case four asymmetries limited the impact of purchasing by 
agents such as insurers: information asymmetry, political power asymmetry, market power asymmetry, and 
financial asymmetry. Given such weaknesses, it should not be surprising that strategic purchasing and its kin 
concepts have been more attractive on paper than consequential in practice. 
Elaborate purchasing initiatives can increase, or create, transaction costs, as they were added to 
systems based on some simpler form of planning and organizational coordination. Their effects are at best 
marginal and difficult to distinguish from patient flows driven by the preferences of patients and providers that 
payers might not have influenced or even known about. In the English case, for example, it seems that there 
might have been benefits on the margins in terms of quality and efficiency, though it is difficult to separate 
such benefits from the simultaneous increase in patient choice and funding under Labour governments. 
Greater transparency, increased accountability, good governance, and subtlety about implementation 
are critical to turn any policy, strategic or not, into a successful initiative. But health care is not immune to 
politics and opportunistic behaviors. Strategic purchasing is, like most policies, a blunt tool under the guise of a 
silver bullet solution. Our scholarly recommendation is to focus future research on understanding why 
strategic purchasing as a policy has persisted for so long. Our policy recommendation is that further 
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would not be worthwhile. Strategic purchasing might be a harmless label for planning or other policies, or it 
might be a repository for misplaced hopes, but it is not a valuable approach to adopt. Focusing on the real 
sources of power in a health care system—information, power, and capital—would direct us away from 
misguided faith in insurers and the alphabet soup of purchasers, and back to the long-standing foci of health 
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Abbreviations: CCG, clinical commissioning group; NHSE, National Health Service England; UHC, universal health 
coverage; VA, Veterans Affairs. 
a Medicare beneficiaries can opt out of traditional Medicare and choose a Medicare Advantage plan. Employer-based 
insurance typically has a choice of purchaser, but this is dependent upon employer. Plans on the market places 
provide consumers with choice of purchaser. Medicaid and the VA do not provide a choice of purchaser. 
b Medicare only provides UHC for individuals 65 years old, younger people with disabilities, and people with end-
stage renal disease. 
 
Table 2. Existing Strategic Purchasing Definitions 
 
Author/ Organization  Definitions  
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… *that+ aims to increase health systems’ 
performance by effectively allocating 
financial resources to providers, by deciding 
the following: which interventions to 
purchase in response to population needs, 
national health priorities, and evidence-
based cost-effectiveness; how to purchase 
these interventions, including contractual 
mechanisms and payment systems; and from 
whom to purchase, taking into account 
quality and efficiency of providers.”  
World Health Organization (2000:97, 104--
107)5  
Purchasing organizations should 
“continuously search for the best 
interventions to purchase, the best providers 
to purchase from, and using the best 
payment mechanisms and contracting 
arrangements possible to achieve the 
highest, equitable health outcomes possible.” 
The following are key elements of strategic 
purchasing:  
1. The use of public health to determine 
priorities for public financing, enforce 
stewardship, and use population health data 
in choosing which interventions to buy 
2. Prioritize units in purchasing in order to 
promote the creation of more long-term 
contracts. 
3. Avoid micro-purchasing and micro-
managing which prevents the pooling of 
health services and populations and prevents 
risk-sharing. 
4. Through budgeting and contracting, 
establish an environment in which there are 
appropriate incentives for providers to (1) 
prevent health problems of pool members, 
(2) provide services and solve health 
problems of members, (3) be responsive to 
people’s legitimate expectations, and (4) 
contain costs. 
5. Establish appropriate political capacity and 
governance to promote flexible provider 
resource management, promote 
accountability, and prevent negative 
consequences of financing reforms. 
World Bank (2007:3-4)6  The World Bank uses a normative approach 
towards their strategic purchasing 
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purchasing policy framework requires 
addressing the following sets of issues in 
order to ensure improved health system 
efficiency and equity. 
1. Political Economy 
a The Political choice about the appropriate 
role of the state, government failure, market 
failure, and stakeholders 
2. Policy Design  
a. Resource Allocation and the Purchasing 
Arrangement which determines for whom to 
buy, what to buy, from whom to buy, how 
much to pay, and how to pay 
b. Revenue Collection Mechanisms which 
include the level of prepayment, degree of 
progressivity, earmarking, choice, and 
enrollment 
c. Pooling of Revenues and Risk Sharing 
which considers the size, number, risk 
equalization, coverage, and risk rating 
3. Organizational Structure  
a. The organizational forms (including 
contractual relationships), structural 
configuration, and incentive regimes at play 
4. Institutional Environment 
a. The legal frameworks, regulatory 
instruments, administrative procedures, and 
customs and practices 
5. Management Capacity  
a. The management levels, skills, incentives, 
and tools available 
UK Department of Health (2007:3-6)9  The United Kingdom, which arguably started 
the whole purchasing conversation with its 
1980s purchaser-provider split, incorporated 
strategic purchasing into their commissioning 
cycle for health services (“commissioning” is 
the term for strategic purchasing in England 
since 1997). The cycle is centered on the 
patient/public and attempts to meet national 
health targets. While the English NHS has 
since been reorganized so as to leave the 
context of this particular document 
irrelevant, the model it contains is worth 
noting: 
1. “Assessing needs 
2. Reviewing service provision 
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4. esigning services 
5. Shaping the structure of supply 
6. Managing demand 
7. Referrals, individual needs assessment, 
advice on choices, and treatment/activity 
8. Managing performance (quality, 
performance, outcomes) 
9. Seeking public and patient views” 
Honda et al. (RESYST consortium) for WHO-
WPRO (2015:4)14  
“In strategic purchasing, a purchaser is an 
organization that buys health services, using 
pooled funds, for certain groups or the entire 
population. The purchaser can use levers to 
influence the behavior of providers to 
improve quality and efficiency in health 
service provision and facilitate equity in the 
distribution of healthcare providers. 
However, purchasing mechanisms operate 
within each country’s policy framework and, 
in strategic purchasing, government is 
required to play a stewardship role by 
providing a clear policy framework and 
appropriate guidance to ensure that resource 
allocation and purchasing decisions are 
linked to public health priorities. As the 
purchaser buys health services for people, it 
is important for the purchaser to ensure that 
there are effective mechanisms in place to 
determine and reflect people’s needs, 
preferences and values in purchasing, and 
hold healthcare providers accountable to the 
people.” 
Synthesized Definition An evidence-based process that sculpts 
health care systems by prioritizing the 
financing of certain goods and services over 
others through collaborative planning across 
various healthcare stakeholders while 
incorporating the needs and priorities of 
citizens in the distribution of health care and 
promoting equity, quality of care, efficiency, 
and responsiveness in the provision of health 
services. 
Source: Klasa K, Greer S, van Ginneken E. Strategic purchasing in practice: comparing ten European countries. Health 
Policy. 2018;122(5):457-472. 
 








Information  When one actor has more information than 
the other; in purchasing decisions, this 
occurs when the patient or provider has 
more information than the purchaser, which 
prevents effective needs assessment or 
utilization reviews and leads to inefficient 
purchasing contracts. 
Political power When one actor has more political power 
than the other; in purchasing, this occurs 
when the purchaser has less power than 
patients, providers, or politicians, which 
prevents its ability to intentionally affect and 
influence the behaviors of providers, limiting 
its ability to discipline, ensure compliance, 
and uphold accountability.  
Market power When there is a lack of competition and/or 
imbalance in the marketplace; in purchasing, 
this occurs when a purchaser has no exit 
option or capacity to negotiate effectively 
due to geographic limitations or powerful 
strategic “sellers” (ie, monopoly or oligopoly 
providers and hospitals).  
Financial  When one actor in a transaction lacks the 
financial leverage required to receive more 
than the marginal cost of the transaction; in 
purchasing, this occurs when a purchaser 
does not have enough future income, funds, 
or power to finance capital investment 
compared to other health care actors.  
 
1. Political Economy 
a. The Political choice about the appropriate role of the state, government failure, 
market failure, and stakeholders 
2. Policy Design 
a. Resource Allocation and the Purchasing Arrangement which determines for whom 
to buy, what to buy, from whom to buy, how much to pay, and how to pay 
b. Revenue Collection Mechanisms which include the level of prepayment, degree of 
progressivity, earmarking, choice, and enrollment 
c. Pooling of Revenues and Risk Sharing which considers the size, number, risk 
equalization, coverage, and risk rating 
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a. The organizational forms (including contractual relationships), structural 
configuration, and incentive regimes at play 
4. Institutional Environment 
a. The legal frameworks, regulatory instruments, administrative procedures, and 
customs and practices 
5. Management Capacity 
The management levels, skills, incentives, and tools available 
